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Introduction
The aim of this paper is to introduce Derrida’s important work on 
forgiveness. There are a number of papers and essays that engage 
with and develop it in various ways.(1) My concern here is not to 
develop an original argument but rather to provide an introduction, 
which will hopefully encourage readers to go on to take up Derri-
1- A quite sizable literature has developed considering various aspects of  Derrida’s work on forgiveness. 
In addition to consulting the works by Derrida and others cited in the footnotes, some of  those listed 
below may be of  interest to those wishing to follow this debate further. Inclusion in this bibliography 
does not mean I necessarily agree with the author’s representation of  Derrida’s views. See: Bernstein, 
Richard J., ‘The Aporia of  Forgiveness’ Constellations 13: 3 (2006), 394-406; Caputo, John D., Mark 
Dooley and John L. Scanlon, ‘Introduction: God Forgive’ in Questioning God (Indiana University Press, 
2001), 1-18, especially 1 -10; Janover, M., ‘The Limits of  Forgiveness and the Ends of  Politics’ The 
Journal of  Intercultural Studies 26:3 (2005), 221-35; Kapousy, C., ‘ “Continental” Text, “Analytic” Reading: 
The Case of  Derrida’s “On Forgiveness” ’ International Journal of  Philosophic Studies 13:2 (2005), 203-26; 
Krapp, Peter, ‘Amnesty: Between an Ethics of  Forgiveness and a Politics of  Forgetting’ German Law 
Journal 185 (2005); Lotz, Christian, ‘The Events of  Morality and Forgiveness: From Kant to Derrida’ 
Research in Phenomenology 36:1 (2006), 255-73; Perrone-Moisés, Cláudia, ‘Forgiveness and crimes against 
humanity: A dialogue between Hannah Arendt and Jacques Derrida’. English translation online at: 
http://www.hannaharendt.net/index.php/han/article/view/90/146 (accessed: 28 December 2012); 
Schaap, A., ‘The Protopolitics of  Reconciliation: Lefort and the Aporia of  Forgiveness in Arendt and 
Derrida’ Australian Journal of  Political Science 41:4 (2006), 615-30; Thompson, Janaa, ‘Is Apology a Sorry 
Affair? Derrida and the Moral Force of  the Impossible’ The Philosophical Forum 41:3 (2010), 259-74; van 
Tongeren, Paul, ‘Impossible Forgiveness’ Ethical Perspectives 15:3 (2008), 369-379; Verdeja, E., ‘Derrida 
and the Impossibility of  Forgiveness’ Contemporary Political Theory 3:1 (2004), 23-47; Wyschogrod, Edith, 
‘Repentance and Forgiveness: The Undoing of  Time’ International Journal for the Philosophy of  Religion 
60:1-3 (2006), 157-68. 
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da’s work on forgiveness themselves. Derrida’s work on this subject 
is significant and overlooked both academically and elsewhere. For 
example, a conference held just this March in Antwerp, Belgium, 
focused on the theme of apology. In the conference announcement, 
apology was presented as a tool, something that can be used in busi-
ness, in politics, or even in religion. Derrida’s belief is that the act 
of forgiveness is something that goes beyond such manipulations.(2) 
Derrida’s philosophy is often divided into two periods, the second 
of which is named ‘late’, although he is consistent over the range 
of his work in a way that is perhaps unusual. While there is noth-
ing in Derrida similar to the well-known ‘turning’ of Heidegger, 
there is a switch of emphasis and mode in the last twenty years 
of his life with the treatment of questions in what might be called 
practical philosophy being given greater prominence. This is often 
seen to commence with a paper ‘Force of Law’ given in 1989, which 
distinguishes law and justice. For Derrida, law is the operation of 
established rules and procedures, whereas justice is a response to 
singularity that exceeds law. Forgiveness is among the topics treat-
ed in the late period and is not unrelated to the questions of law and 
justice, and the response to exceptional singularity, as we will see. 
In 1997-8 Derrida held a seminar in Paris entitled; Questions de re-
sponsabilité VII: le parjure et le pardon’. The following year ‘Ques-
tions de responsabilité VIII’ concerned the same topic. Both of these 
have yet to be published either in French or English translation. 
There are, however, two main places in print where Derrida treats 
forgiveness. The first is in On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, a 
short book published by Routledge in its ‘Thinking in Action’ se-
ries in 2001. This contains two independent lectures, the second of 
which focuses on forgiveness, and is the text of a lecture first pre-
sented in 1997 at Jerusalem and previously published in Studies in 
2- Two short videos on Derrida and forgiveness, one an excerpt from Amy Kofman’s feature length Jacques 
Derrida (2002) filmed in South Africa and the other, a seminar in Paris, made in the year he died,for the 
European Graduate School were shown at this stage in the paper by way of  introduction: (i) http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=qDrU1jtt_fI (accessed: 28 December 2012); (ii) http://www.dailymotion.
com/video/xn0cyn_jacques-derrida-on-forgiving-the-unforgivable_creation (accessed: 28 December 
2012).
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Practical Philosophy.(3) The second is an essay ‘To Forgive: The Un-
forgivable and the Imprescriptible’ published the same year in a 
volume entitled Questioning God.(4) In addition to these two essays, 
Derrida also addressed the question of forgiveness in a TV inter-
view after his Jerusalem lecture (the transcript of which is available 
online) and in a roundtable discussion, the transcript of which was 
published directly after his essay in Questioning God.(5)
The two essays cover a lot of similar ground although we can very 
roughly say that On Forgiveness presents a more general outline while 
‘To Forgive’ focuses more on Derrida’s reading of Jankélévitch, al-
though neither essay really conforms entirely to such a description 
and it is best to read them both together. In what follows I will pre-
sent my own interpretation of Derrida’s main points, initially fol-
lowing On Forgiveness, but drawing on both the major essays as well 
as the interview and the roundtable.
In On Forgiveness Derrida begins his thoughts on forgiveness with 
the proliferation of ‘scenes’ of forgiveness. He particularly men-
tions the case of the then Japanese prime minister asking forgive-
ness from the Koreans and the Chinese for acts committed in his 
country’s past. It is easy to add to this list: Tony Blair asking forgive-
ness for the Irish Famine of 1845-50 or Pope Jean-Paul II apologiz-
ing for Roman Catholic involvement with the African slave trade. 
The University of Pennsylvania has a webpage, which attempts to 
comprehensively document such political apologies.(6) Derrida’s 
feeling about such spectacles is that: “forgiveness dominates the 
whole scene, and on the other hand, it has become, hollow, void, 
attenuated”. He speaks of his own work as “a measure to control 
political rhetoric.”(7) 
3- Jacques Derrida, ‘On Forgiveness’ in On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (Routledge, 2001), 27-58; Jacques 
Derrida, ‘On Forgiveness’ Studies in Practical Philosophy (2000), 2:2, 81-102.
4- Jacques Derrida, ‘To Forgive: The Unforgivable and the Imprescriptible’ in John D. Caputo, Michael 
Scanlon and Mark Dolley (eds), Questioning God (Indiana University Press, 2001), 21-51. 
5- ‘On Forgiveness: A Roundtable Discussion with Jacques Derrida’ in Questioning God, 52-72.
6- http://www.upenn.edu/pnc/politicalapologies.html (accessed: 28 December 2012)
7- ‘On Forgiveness: A Roundtable’, 54, 57. 
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Derrida observes how in France presidents (he cites three very dif-
ferent ones: de Gaulle, Pompidou, and Mitterand) have repeatedly 
used the same language of ‘national unity’ when they proceed to 
reconciliation by the use of amnesty. This has been the case whether 
the occasion has been the Occupation or the Algerian War. He notes 
how at the time of the amnesty of 1951, people talked of the need, in 
the face of the communist threat, to ‘forget’ and bring back into the 
national community former collaborators. “There is always a stra-
tegical or political calculation in the generous gesture of one who 
offers reconciliation or amnesty.” This, he says, has nothing to do 
with forgiveness: “forgiveness does not, it should never, amount 
to a therapy of reconciliation”.(8) He has nothing against the pro-
cesses of reconciliation, which he sees as important, but he argues 
we should not take them to be the same as forgiveness. 
Before he turns to his examination of the question of forgiveness, 
Derrida suggests that there are two elements that need to be noted 
as background to the recent proliferation of scenes of forgiveness: (1) 
Globolatinization: This is a term Derrida uses on a number of other 
occasions as a way of criticizing, complicating, and complementing 
the much used concept of globalization. In the case of forgiveness, 
what he wishes to stress is the way that this idea arises within one 
particular religious tradition, that of the peoples of the book, the 
Abrahamic tradition. This heritage, which he stresses is not without 
its internal contradictions, is on its way to globalization. We need 
to honestly acknowledge that the increasing use of the language of 
forgiveness on the global scene is not a neutral development but 
part of wider processes, which are not without cultural violence. 
He points out that the language of forgiveness is alien to some tra-
ditions such as that of Japan or Korea. Yet today, we see the Japa-
nese prime minister ask forgiveness of the Koreans and the Chinese. 
Derrida argues that “the ‘globalization’ of forgiveness resembles an 
immense scene of confession in progress, thus a virtually Christian 
convulsion-conversion-confession, a process of Christianisation 
8- Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 40-1.
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which has no more need for the Christian church”.(9) In particular, 
Derrida notes, speaking of the case of South Africa with its well 
known Truth and Reconciliation Commission: “with as much good 
will as confusion, it seems to me, Tutu, an Anglican archbishop 
introduced the vocabulary of repentance and forgiveness. He was 
reproached for this, among other things, by a non-Christian seg-
ment of the black community”.(10) And (2) Crimes against human-
ity: the multiplication of scenes of forgiveness is linked to this new 
legal development. He calls this “a concept still obscure in its lim-
its, fragile in its foundations”.(11) He points out a paradox whereby 
those events which established the rights of man and the concepts 
of crimes against humanity—the most obvious example being the 
French Revolution—can also be seen to have been the occasion of 
crimes against humanity themselves. Again, as so often in his work, 
he shows the ubiquity and ineliminability of violence.
Against the background of these points I would now like to intro-
duce Derrida’s analysis of the concept of forgiveness. At the risk of 
myself doing violence to the subtlety of his thought, I will break it 
down under four main headings, which I will name as follows: (i) 
the gift of forgiveness; (ii) the paradox of forgiveness; (iii) the secret 
of forgiveness; and (iv) the power(lessness) of forgiveness. 
The Gift of Forgiveness
The scenes of forgiveness that are so common in today’s world—
Derrida cited the case of the Japanese prime minister—aim at pro-
ducing reconciliation and normalization. They are not pure and 
disinterested. He says: “Each time forgiveness is at the service of a 
finality, be it noble and spiritual (atonement or redemption, recon-
ciliation, salvation), each time that it aims to re-establish a normal-
ity (social, national, political,  psychological) by a work of mourn-
9- Ibid., 31. 
10- Ibid., 42. 
11- Ibid., 30.
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ing, by some therapy or ecology of memory, then ‘forgiveness’ is 
not pure—nor is its concept”.(12) 
What interests him and motivates his writings on forgiveness is 
the pursuit of a forgiveness that is excessive. Derrida stresses that 
forgiveness should be distinguished from related themes such as 
excuse, regret, amnesty. These he sees as all in various ways being 
governed by law (and we will remember that he crucially distin-
guishes law and justice). Indeed, he commences his essay ‘To For-
give’ by pointing out that there is a gift in forgiveness as well as in 
pardon (one of the French words for gift is don). Derrida does not 
want to conflate forgiveness and the gift (he points out, for exam-
ple, that the former concerns the past whereas the latter does not) 
but he does argue they are indissociable. 
To understand the gift in forgiveness, we perhaps need to know a 
little more about what Derrida has to say about the gift more gener-
ally. One way to briefly summarize the issues at stake is via refer-
ence to his criticism of the work of Marcel Mauss. In The Gift, Mauss 
had proclaimed the superiority of the potlatch of primitive societies 
over the exchange economy of modern capitalism. Derrida carefully 
follows and unpicks his arguments and shows how obligations are 
already inherent in the primitive system, as evidenced by Mauss’ 
use of the term ‘gift-exchange’. Derrida suggests that, contrary to 
the primitive practice Mauss praises, in order for there to be a gift 
it must not be reciprocated. There must be a break with economy, 
with give and take, with return. As soon as one starts to say thank 
you for the gift, it is canceled because I have received something in 
return, even if that is only the satisfaction of a ‘thank you’.  
Derrida will thus go so far as to say: “if I am conscious that I forgive, 
then I not only recognize myself but I thank myself, or I am waiting 
for the other to thank me, which is already the reinscription of for-
giveness into an economy of exchange and hence the annihilation 
of forgiveness”.(13) Forgiveness occurs beyond all considerations of 
12- Ibid., 32.
13- ‘On Forgiveness: A Roundtable’, 53. 
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give and take. As Derrida says in a book on Lévinas, to forgive, to 
proceed ‘by-gift’ (par-don in the French), is to give a gift that goes be-
yond economy.(14) Similarly, he says in an interview: “one forgives, 
if one forgives, beyond any categorical imperative, beyond any debt 
and obligation”.(15) Forgiveness is a gift that exceeds any calculation 
or economy: “if I grant forgiveness on condition that the other con-
fess, that the other begin to redeem himself, to transfigure his fault, 
to dissociate himself from it in order to ask me for forgiveness, then 
my forgiveness begins to let itself be contaminated by an economy, 
a calculation that corrupts it”.(16) 
The Paradox of Forgiveness
Derrida argues that at the heart of forgiveness we are beset by para-
dox: “if there is something to forgive, it would be what in religious 
language is called mortal sin, the worst, the unforgivable crime or 
harm.” This is a point he repeats in a number of different statements: 
“forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable.” “It can only be possi-
ble in doing the impossible”.(17) Forgiveness is what Derrida calls 
‘an event’, a matter which concerns him in many different forms 
throughout his writings: how does the absolutely new, the impos-
sible, come to happen, to be possible. In drawing out this paradox, 
Derrida turns to examine two works by Vladimir Jankélévitch. The 
first is Le Pardon and the second L’Impresciptible.(18) The background 
to this second publication is the 1964 law in France making crimes 
against humanity imprescriptible, that is, without legal time limit. 
In that essay, Jankélévitch says all is forgivable except the crime 
against the humanity of man, the crime against what makes a man, 
14- Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Lévinas (Stanford University Press, 1999), 112. 
15- Jacques Derrida, Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews (Stanford University Press, 2002), 351. 
16- Derrida, ‘To Forgive’, 46. 
17- Derrida, On Forgiveness, 32. 
18- Derrida also talks about Jankélévitch in an interview with Dr Michal Ben-Naftali, wbroadcast on televi-
sion shortly after the Jerusalem lecture and at which he first presented the text that was later printed 
in On Forgiveness: http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%203851.pdf  (ac-
cessed: 28 December 2012). 
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a man. This, Derrida says, is similar to Hegel’s argument that all is 
forgivable except the crime against spirit. 
Derrida contests Jankélévitch’s point. He argues that the Abraham-
ic tradition of forgiveness contains an unresolved and unresolvable 
tension between conditional and unconditional forgiveness. The 
first would be gracious, infinite, granted to the guilty as guilty and 
even to those who do not ask forgiveness. The second would be 
conditional, proportional and carefully considered, granted to the 
repentant, who are then no longer guilty in the same way as before. 
His suggestion is that there is a double and contradictory injunction 
at work when we talk of forgiveness. 
In ‘L’Imprescriptible’, Jankélévitch, speaking of the Germans, refus-
es to forgive in the absence of repentance. He says, and we might do 
well to remember that his personal background was that of a Rus-
sian Jew, that the Shoah is ‘inexpiable’ and ‘irreparable’. In the name 
of the victims, Derrida suggests, he speaks to us of a duty of non-
forgiveness. “Forgiveness died in the death camps,” Jankélévitch 
says. Yet elsewhere, in Le Pardon, as Derrida observes, he speaks of 
the absolute forgiveness inspired by Jewish and Christian sources. 
Indeed he talks there of “an imperative of love” and a “hyperbolic 
ethics”.(19) The two positions become intertwined in an exchange of 
letters between Jankélévitch and Wiard Raveling, a young German, 
following the publication of ‘L’Imprescriptible’. In a moving corre-
spondence, which Jankélévitch says he has waited thirty-five years 
for, he appears to maintain his positions while speaking of being 
too old to join with the young German. Derrida examines the texts 
is some detail and suggests that “the uncrossable will remain un-
crossable at the very same moment it will have been crossed over”.(20) 
Perhaps Jankélévitch does forgive even while protesting he does 
19- Le pardon was first published in French in 1967. Andrew Kelley translated it into English as Forgiveness in 
2005. L ‘Imprescriptible’s first French edition was 1971. As yet only a section (perhaps confusingly entitled 
“Pardonner?”) has yet been translated into English. See Ann Hobart (trans.) ‘Should We Pardon Them?’ 
Critical Inquiry 22 (1996), 552-72. The editors of  the Routledge volume unfortunately failed to footnote 
the original sources for Derrida’s quotes or to note whether the translations were his own or not. There 
is a similar problem in relation to Arendt. 
20- Derrida, ‘To Forgive’, 41. 
[25]Edward Alam
not! As we shall see in the section on the secret of forgiveness, if we 
can never finally comprehend the experience of forgiveness, we can 
never certify it as having taken place on any particular occasion.  
In his analysis, Derrida questions a number of assumptions that are 
implicit in Jankélévitch’s thought. Firstly, that forgiveness must be 
asked for. Derrida thinks not:
“I wonder if a rupture of this reciprocity or this symmetry, if the 
very dissociation between forgiveness asked for and forgiveness 
granted, were not de rigueur for all forgiveness worthy of the 
name.”(21) A second is that forgiveness is something human, or that 
it is a correlate of the possibility of punishing. Jankélévitch says: 
“men are unable to forgive what they cannot punish.”(22) This lat-
ter point is one Arendt also makes: “Punishment has something in 
common with forgiveness, as it tends to put a limit on something 
that without intervention could continue indefinitely.” Jankélévitch 
and Arendt thus argue that the unforgivable is also unpunishable. 
Derrida would contest such a link and, indeed, would suggest that, 
on the contrary, the only thing that really calls for forgiveness is 
the unforgiveable. In the middle of ‘On Forgiveness’, Derrida opens 
up a series of questions for which he does not presume to finally 
produce answers; these ‘immense questions are left open’. In pur-
suing them instead of finding answers, in a Socratic way, we only 
deepen the paradox of forgiveness. The first question is: “What do 
I forgive? And whom? What and whom? Something or someone?”(23) 
Is it an act we forgive or a person? Here a whole series of questions 
open up as to whether the person who committed the act and the 
person who is forgiven are the same. There is, for example, an am-
biguity in the tradition of thought on forgiveness about whether 
we are forgiving the perpetrator of an act or a repentant who later 
asks for forgiveness. Derrida rejects the idea that the later really is 
21- Ibid., 27. 
22- Derrida, On Forgiveness, 30. 
23- Ibid., 38. 
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forgiveness and suggests: “in order for there to be forgiveness, must 
one not... forgive both the fault and the guilty as such”.(24)
A second question is who is asked to forgive? Is it God? Is it the vic-
tim? Derrida observes how the Roman Catholic Church in France 
asked forgiveness concerning acts and omissions during the Second 
World War.(25) But this forgiveness was not asked of the population 
in general or of the victims. Speaking of the Shoah, Derrida says 
(echoing Simon Wisenthal): “only the victims have the right to for-
give... the question of forgiveness cannot be asked today as such, in 
pure form”.(26) Indeed, he suggests that the reason we ask God for 
forgiveness is not because ‘only God can forgive’ (as some people 
might say) but because God becomes ‘the absolute substitute’, ‘an 
absolute superstes’, ‘an absolute and unnameable singularity’, ‘the 
absolute witness’. When there is nobody to ask forgiveness of, there 
remains only God to ask forgiveness of.  
Related to this is the question of whether the scene of forgiveness 
is individual or institutional. Does it require a face-to-face situation 
or is an institutional mediation possible? Derrida suggests that in 
principle forgiveness must engage two singularities: the guilty and 
the victim. As soon as there is a third party, then the scene becomes 
one of amnesty, reconciliation, or reparation. This is a point made 
by one of the witnesses who appeared before the Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission in South Africa. Speaking in one of the eleven 
languages recognized by the South African Constitution, she said 
(as translated by Dr Tutu): “A commission or a government can-
not forgive. Only I, eventually, could do it. (And I am not ready to 
forgive).”(27) As Derrida points out in the ‘Roundtable’ these words 
in English are ambiguous (and we do not have them preserved in 
the original language), but what is clear from them is the sugges-
tion that the representative of the State can judge but s/he has no 
role in forgiveness. As we shall see, Kant makes the same argument 
24- Ibid., 39. 
25- This position is also elaborated on pp4-5 of  Derrida’s Jerusalem interview. 
26- Interview, 17. 
27- Derrida, On Forgiveness, 43. 
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that forgiveness is something beyond the law. But then who can 
forgive? Can the wife of the disappeared man even forgive? There 
is strictly speaking, Derrida suggests, nobody of whom forgiveness 
can be asked in the case of the disappeared. 
As we grapple with the paradoxes of forgiveness, we come to face 
the impossibility of forgiveness. In ‘On Forgiveness’ Derrida asks: 
“Must one not maintain that an act of forgiveness worthy of its 
name, if there ever is such a thing, must forgive the unforgivable 
and without condition.” He makes clear his position in ‘To Forgive’: 
“there is only forgiveness, if there is such a thing, of the un-forgive-
able. Thus forgiveness, if it is possible, if there is such a thing, is 
not possible, it does not exist as possible, it only exists by exempt-
ing itself from the law of possibility”.(28) We reach a point where 
we are forced to concede: “forgiveness is mad...a madness of the 
impossible”.(29) This is not to say that it does not happen or that we 
should not try to make it happen. Forgiveness will not occur unless 
we engage in concrete ways in actual situations. Equally, amnesty, 
reconciliation and reparation cannot happen without reference to 
the horizon of a pure forgiveness. We never have one entirely with-
out the other. “If we want to embody an unconditional forgiveness 
in history and society, we have to go through conditions. We have 
to negotiate the unconditional and the conditional.”(30) We must risk 
forgiveness but we must do so responsibility not blindly. 
The Secret of Forgiveness
Forgiveness is an act of communication. In order to engage in for-
giveness the fault must be understood, who is guilty and of what 
must be known. Yet Derrida thinks it improbable that we can ever 
finally possess such complete knowledge. Just to begin with, think 
through any situation in need of forgiveness: Is it possible that both 
sides can be fully aware of everything that makes up that situation? 
28- Derrida, ‘To Forgive’, 48. 
29- Derrida, On Forgiveness, 39. 
30- Derrida, ‘To Forgive’, 58. 
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If the victim understands, speaks and agrees with the offender, rec-
onciliation has been commenced not forgiveness. Indeed, even if 
they just do this while saying, “I do not forgive,” a process of rec-
onciliation has still begun. When we say we understand an offense 
or offender, the offending act as something in need of forgiveness 
disappears. We know why someone did something and we might 
then say that the act that offended has been explained away. We can 
also imagine someone—Derrida says—“a victim of the worst” who 
demands justice and that those criminals appear before a court, yet 
in his heart forgives. Forgiveness exceeds comprehensibility; it is 
something for which we can never fully account. Again, we press 
the limits of rationality: “Forgiveness is thus mad. It must plunge 
lucidly into the night of the unintelligible.”(31) 
Another way of saying this is to say that forgiveness is secret. Again, 
similar to the gift this is a term Derrida uses repeatedly elsewhere in 
his work and perhaps needs some elaboration for those unfamiliar 
with his philosophy.(32) The secret, for Derrida, is that which exceeds 
the political or the judicial; it is what is inaccessible to them. It is that 
which is unreadable and inaccessible in principle. Derrida says that 
the other is constituted by the secret. This does not mean that there 
is a particular matter about which I am not being told but that I 
can never, in principle, know another (human or otherwise) in their 
entirety and exhaustively. Indeed, Derrida argues I can never know 
myself comprehensively. I am a secret from myself. This secret is 
the condition of any communication. We can never communicate 
with complete transparency because our communications, similar 
to our selves, are structured by the secret. My meaning is in ex-
cess of my intention, or as Lévinas puts it, the saying exceeds the 
said.(33) Forgiveness is secret then because to forgive another is to 
engage in a process that is more than a communication. Derrida in-
sists regarding forgiveness: “The secret of this experience remains. 
31- Derrida, On Forgiveness, 49. 
32- See further Jacques Derrida, A Taste for the Secret (Polity, 2001). 
33-  Emmanuel Lévinas famously introduces this distinction in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (Spring-
er, 1981). 
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It must remain intact, inaccessible to law, to politics, even to morals: 
absolute.” He asks us to: “Imagine a victim of terrorism, a person 
whose children have been deported or had their throats cut, or an-
other whose family was killed in a death oven. Whether she says ‘I 
forgive’ or ‘I do not forgive’ in either case I am not sure of under-
standing. I am even sure of not understanding and in any case have 
nothing to say. This zone of experience remains inaccessible and I 
must respect its secret.”(34) The experience of forgiveness is incom-
municable. 
The Powerlessness of Forgiveness
We have seen several times Derrida pointing out that forgiveness is 
something that happens beyond the judicial or penal sphere. Yet, he 
also observes “the only inscription of forgiveness in the law, in ju-
ridical legislation, is no doubt the right to grant clemency”.(35) Clem-
ency, it will be remembered, is the act by which, in many countries, 
in both the monarchical and republican traditions, a head of state 
can pardon a criminal. Derrida observes that this ‘right of grace’ 
amounts to a power above the law and, thus, even this occasion of 
forgiveness, that is inscribed within the law, exceeds the law. At the 
top of the system of law is a power that escapes it. Derrida notes 
that this is theological in origin, a divine right. Usually this is secu-
larized, but in the case of the United States it is not even that (the 
President takes an oath on the Bible, uses religious language in of-
ficial discourse and invokes God in addressing the nation). Kant in-
sists in the Metaphysics of Morals that this right should only be used 
by the sovereign to pardon crimes relating to himself lest injustice 
result. He thereby implies that “forgiveness in general should only 
be permitted on the part of the victim” (a position we have seen 
Derrida mention before).(36) With regard to the possibility of injus-
tice, Derrida cites the case of Bill Clinton pardoning a number of 
Puerto Ricans imprisoned for terrorism at a time when his wife was 
34- Derrida, On Forgiveness, 55.
35- Derrida, ‘To Forgive’, 32. 
36- Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of  Morals, Introduction to §50 and following. Derrida, ‘To Forgive’, 34. 
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running for the senate in New York State, which has a large popula-
tion from that island.
If forgiveness is a gift, a secret, impossible, who could rightfully 
assume the power to forgive? Derrida says that “what makes the ‘I 
forgive you’ sometimes unbearable, or odious, even obscene is the 
affirmation of sovereignty”.(37) Given that we can never fully give 
reasons for forgiving, Derrida can find objections to the assump-
tion of the power to forgive. Bearing this in mind he wants us to 
constantly question who can forgive and to remember victims who 
are powerless to forgive. He not only sees the misuse of forgiveness 
as an additional crime but also argues that ultimately “one would 
have to be forgiven forgiveness”.(38) Nobody has a right to forgive, 
a power that could be fully justified and legitimated. Forgiveness 
never occurs without someone presuming this power to forgive that 
they can never be assured of having. Nobody can claim the right to 
forgive, no-one can be sure they are engaged in forgiveness rather 
than merely some process of reconciliation. Yet forgiveness hap-
pens. The power of forgiveness is also the powerlessness of forgive-
ness. As Derrida concludes: “What I dream of, what I try to think 
of as the ‘purity’ of a forgiveness worthy of its name, would be a 
forgiveness without power: unconditional but without sovereignty.”(39) 
Conclusion
In his work on forgiveness, Derrida attempts to rationally account 
for an act, which exceeds any final rational accountability. It is not 
surprising then that his texts on the subject are found to be diffi-
cult. Forgiveness is paradoxical and we must constantly go against 
common assumptions in trying to comprehend what happens with-
in this act. In an introduction to Derrida’s work on forgiveness, it 
would be inappropriate to plunge into the details of the second-
ary literature on the topic. I would, however, like in conclusion to 
37- Derrida, On Forgiveness, 58. 
38- Derrida, ‘To Forgive’, 22. 
39- Derrida, On Forgiveness, 59. 
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warn against two errors or ways of misreading that are commonly 
repeated. 
The first is to fail to come to grips with either Derrida’s texts on 
forgiveness or, more commonly, the philosophical background to 
these essays (i.e. his ethics of the other, his work on the gift, the 
secret, etc). Under this heading, I would, for example, include Con-
temporary Political Theory which published an essay by Ernesto Ver-
deja in 2004 that objects to the way that Derrida allegedly “requires 
forgettfulness”.(40) This line of argument (without even proceeding 
to examine others) is, however, completely invalidated by Derrida’s 
explicit statement in ‘To Forgive’ (2002) that “forgiving is not for-
getting (another enormous problem)”.(41) 
Other authors, I would turn to here, such as Andrew Fiala, give 
accounts of Derrida’s work on forgiveness that pay no attention 
whatsoever to the distinctions he has gone great trouble to establish 
in his texts on forgiveness or elsewhere in his work. Fiala says non-
chalantly, “I will use the term ‘justice’ as more or less equivalent to 
‘retributive justice’ ”, ignoring everything Derrida has said in ‘Force 
of Law’ and after about the difference between law and justice; Fiala 
fails to understand, therefore, how for Derrida forgiveness is a re-
sponse to a singularity that is inspired by justice and goes beyond 
law. This misreading seems to be largely motivated by a desire to 
ignore what Derrida has to say concerning the way in which we can 
never fully account for an act of forgiveness and to return it to be-
ing something for which we can give a complete rational account. 
Verdeja similarly thinks that one can forget about the complexity 
of Derrida’s analysis merely by pointing out ‘disturbing implica-
tions’ (philosophy would never have begun if Socrates had taken 
‘disturbing implications’ as grounds for dismissing an argument).(42) 
Time and again, this move is played against Derrida and rather than 
facing up to the ethical challenges contained in the act of forgive-
40- Ernesto Verdeja, ‘Derrida and the Impossibility of  Forgiveness’ Contemporary Political Theory 3 (2004), 
43. 
41- Derrida, ‘To Forgive’, 23. 
42- Verdeja, ‘Derrida and the Impossibility of  Forgiveness’, 23.
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ness, which he clearly show us, his arguments are sidestepped and 
we are comforted with the possibility of schemas of conditions that 
could be met for forgiveness to be said to have taken place. 
I suggest that we should follow Derrida and take up the responsibil-
ity of forgiveness, an ethical task that must be undertaken without 
any assurance from philosophers that we can know with certain-
ty that we have ultimately done the right thing. This is not to say 
we should abandon rational discussion of forgiveness, as Derrida 
points out: “when I opposed the conditional to the unconditional 
I immediately added that they were absolutely irreducible to one 
another but indissociable”.(43) Derrida does not object to pragma-
tism and processes of reconciliation, and would never deny that we 
sorely need those on many occasions. Yet, he does not confuse them 
with the almost unbearable demands made by elements of the con-
cept of forgiveness we have inherited from the tradition. We need 
to understand what it is we do when we forgive, which perhaps 
means above all understanding that forgiveness is a leap that we 
must risk but that we can never finally justify. 
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